I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System by Listokin, Yair & Schizer, David M.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2137044
 
    I Like To Pay Taxes:   
Taxpayer Support for Government Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System 
 
  By Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer1 
    Draft of August 24, 2012 
   Please do not quote this draft without permission 
 
     Abstract 
This paper is based on a simple proposition, which we believe but cannot prove:  If 
taxpayers support the way their tax dollars are spent, they are more likely to comply voluntarily 
and less likely to change their behavior to avoid tax.  To show that our claim is plausible, we 
offer direct evidence from a literature involving experiments, draw on the more general 
economics and psychology literature on prosocial behavior, and also invoke philanthropy as a 
“real world” analogy; after all, charitable donors contribute money voluntarily (indeed, 2% of 
the U.S. GDP), largely because they believe in the way their contributions are used. 
 Our claim has a number of concrete policy applications.  The government should 
publicize popular uses of tax dollars, and go to particular lengths to avoid the negative publicity 
associated with waste.  The government also should make broader use of taxes, like lotteries for 
education and the social security tax, which are dedicated to specific (popular) spending 
programs.  In addition to proposing greater reliance on user fees, we offer a new justification for 
subsidiarity – the idea that services should be provided by the lowest level of government 
competent to do so – on the theory that taxpayers will feel more connected to a local or state 
government’s activities and less inclined to free ride within a homogeneous local community.  
We also suggest ways to adjust audit strategy and penalty structure to enhance prosocial 
motivations.  Furthermore, we urge the government to seek voluntary contributions from 
taxpayers for programs they especially value.  Finally, we explore the more controversial step of 
allowing taxpayers to allocate some of their tax bill to programs they value, and conclude that, 
at most, taxpayers should be permitted to do so only in a very limited way. 
  
                                                          
1 We are grateful for comments received from Yishai Baer, Kimberly Clausing, Mihir Desai, Michael Doran, 
Elizabeth Emens, Bert Huang, Alex Raskolnikov, Elizabeth Scott, Ethan Yale, and at workshops at Columbia Law 
School, NYU Law School, Hebrew University, and the Interdisciplinary Center in Herziliya. 
"I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilization." 2  Oliver Wendell Holmes 
 
Why do people pay taxes? The simplest answer is that they have a legal obligation to do 
so. But it has long been recognized that this legal obligation alone provides an inadequate 
explanation for taxpaying behavior,3 just as legal obligations generally offer an inadequate 
explanation for most law-abiding activity.4  Another answer, then, is that some people pay taxes 
because – like Oliver Wendell Holmes – they like to do so. In other words, they appreciate that 
the government provides a vast array of public goods, such as rule of law, roads, schools, and aid 
to the poor, and find satisfaction in contributing to the public welfare.   
This paper is based on a simple proposition, which we believe but cannot prove: that our 
tax system will be more effective if taxpayers support the way their tax dollars are spent.  We 
believe they are more likely to comply voluntarily and less likely to change their behavior to 
avoid tax.  To show that our claim is plausible, we offer direct evidence from a literature 
involving experiments.  We also draw on the more general economics and psychology literature 
on prosocial behavior – that is, the propensity to provide for public goods without any economic 
reason for doing so.  In addition, we invoke philanthropy as a “real world” analogy, since 
charitable donors contribute money voluntarily (indeed, 2% of the U.S. GDP),5 largely because 
they believe in the way their contributions are used. 
 Our claim has a number of concrete policy applications.  The government should 
publicize popular uses of tax dollars, and go to particular lengths to avoid the negative publicity 
associated with waste.  The government also should make broader use of taxes, like lotteries for 
education and the social security tax, which are dedicated to specific (popular) spending 
programs.  In addition to proposing greater reliance on user fees, we offer a new justification for 
subsidiarity – the idea that services should be provided by the lowest level of government 
competent to do so – on the theory that taxpayers will feel more connected to a local or state 
government’s activities and less inclined to free ride within a homogeneous local community.  
We also suggest ways to adjust audit strategy and penalty structure to enhance prosocial 
motivations.  Furthermore, we urge the government to seek voluntary contributions from 
taxpayers for programs they especially value.  Finally, we explore the more controversial step of 
                                                          
2 Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court 71 (1961) (quoting Holmes). 
3 James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and Europe, 27 J. ECON. 
PSYCH. 224 (2006) [hereinafter Alm & Torgler, Cultural Differences]; James Alm & Benno Torgler, Estimating 
the Determinants of Tax Morale, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 97TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION, 
2004, MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.: NAT’L TAX ASSOC. 269-274 (2005) [hereinafter Alm & Torgler, Estimating]. 
Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 80-85 (2003).  
4 TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); EDGAR ALLEN LIND & TOM TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988). 
5 In 2011, charitable giving equaled 2.0% of GDP. See Giving USA 2012: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for 
the Year 2011, Executive Summary 21 (chart).  
 
allowing taxpayers to allocate some of their tax bill to programs they value, and conclude that, at 
most, taxpayers should be permitted to do so only in a very limited way.  
 Before we continue, we want to avoid three potential misunderstandings. First, many of 
our recommendations are “symbolic” in the sense that they would have at most a modest effect 
on the way the government actually spends public money.  Instead, our proposals focus on 
providing taxpayers with information and on influencing their perceptions of the tax system.  In 
effect, we are positing that taxpayers have imperfect information about how their tax dollars are 
spent and also, based on a large body of evidence, that they do not always behave rationally, 
such that framing can influence behavior.  As a result, we believe that “symbolic” gestures can 
have real effects on the efficiency of taxation.  A caveat is that we expect framing and 
symbolism to have more influence on individuals than on businesses because of the fiduciary 
duties managers owe to investors, and perhaps also because of the training and professional 
norms of managers.  As a result, our argument is less relevant to corporations and, likewise, to 
investment funds and other sophisticated businesses taxed as pass through entities.  More 
generally, we recognize that behavioral effects can vary and are hard to predict but, in our view, 
this does not make them any less important. 
 Second,  we believe that deceiving taxpayers would be counterproductive. If the 
deception ever comes to light, it would undermine the very prosocial impulses we are trying to 
foster. Our recommendations aim to make the prosocial aspects of taxing and spending more 
salient without deceiving taxpayers.  
 Third, we do not believe that framing will generally make taxpayers “like” paying taxes 
(our title notwithstanding). Instead, the goal of the analysis is to make taxes less painful than 
they currently are, enhancing the efficiency of taxation regardless of the baseline level of ill will 
taxpayers bear  for taxes.  
 Part I explains why the tax system is likely to be more effective if taxpayers support the 
way their tax dollars are spent.  Parts II and III offer institutional applications of this idea. Part 
IV is the conclusion. 
I. Taxpayer Opinions About Spending and the Efficiency of Our Tax System 
 We begin by offering reasons why, in theory, our tax system should be more effective if 
taxpayers support the way their money will be spent.  We then show the plausibility of this claim 
with three sources of empirical evidence: experimental studies on taxpayer responses to the way 
their tax dollars are spent; the more general literature on prosocial behavior; and studies of 
philanthropy.  We then use polling data to show that taxpayer support for government spending 
is weak, at least as measured in certain ways, so that there is significant room for improvement 
on this dimension. 
A. Reducing Enforcement Costs and Tax-Motivated Behavior 
 We begin by asking why it matters whether taxpayers support the way the government 
spends their tax dollars.  After all, taxes are mandatory.  Taxpayers are legally obligated to pay 
them, even if they do not like the way the government uses the money.  Even so, there are two 
reasons why we believe it still matters. 
 First, although taxes are legally mandatory, they are costly to enforce.  A tax system will 
be more legitimate and also more efficient if more people choose to pay voluntarily – that is, if 
the tax system does not depend solely on muscular enforcement to extract taxes from an 
unwilling population.  It is better if taxpayers are motivated not just by fear of legal sanctions, 
but also by support for the government and for the way the money is used.6  At the margin, it 
should take less effort and expense to ensure that they pay.  Of course, in some contexts 
enforcement is already so effective – withholding on wages, for instance – that our argument is 
less relevant.7  Yet in other settings – use taxes, nanny taxes, and cash businesses, for instance – 
enforcement is so costly and impractical that those who pay these levies may feel as if they are 
choosing to do so.    
 Second, if taxpayers support the way their tax dollars are spent, they may be less likely to 
modify their behavior in a range of inefficient ways that would reduce their tax bill.  Although 
the existing literature on the subject focuses on compliance, we seek to broaden the lens.  After 
all, a wide range of taxpayer choices affect tax liability, including how much labor to supply, 
how much to consume, how much to invest in legal tax avoidance strategies, and the like.  If 
taxpayers support the way their tax dollars are spent, this positive feeling could influence these 
other choices as well. For example, taxpayers who like the public goods funded by their tax 
dollars may be less likely to invest in a tax shelter. They may even work more than economists 
suspect because they do not view the marginal tax burden caused by the additional labor as a 
burden without any benefit. As a dollar of tax spent on a desirable public good becomes more 
like a dollar of consumption, the tax becomes less distortive of decision-making.  
B.  Experimental Literature on Taxpayer Responses to Uses of Tax Revenue 
 Yet is there any empirical evidence to support this argument?  Are people really more 
willing to pay taxes when they support how their tax dollars will be spent?  Three experimental 
studies suggest that, in fact, they are.   
 In a 1993 study, James Alm, Betty Jackson, and Michael McKee conducted a lab 
experiment testing whether compliance rates rise when taxpayers support how their money will 
                                                          
6   Dan Kahan emphasizes that tax compliance is enhanced when taxpayers view their taxpaying as part of a 
reciprocal arrangement.  See generally Kahan, supra note 3.  Many of our suggestions below are likely to enhance 
the feelings of reciprocity associated with paying taxes.  
7 For many taxpayers, opportunities for evasive behavior are curtailed by withholding and reporting systems. See  
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Martin Knudsen, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Soren Lonstrup Pedersen, and Emmanuel Saez, 
Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651-692 
(2011) (demonstrating that tax compliance is very high for Danish taxpayers subject to withholding and information 
reporting systems).  
be spent.  They find a significant difference: the average compliance rate falls from .337 for a 
popular use to .081 for an unpopular one.8  As one participant noted, “My payments would be 
lower if I disclosed less [i.e., if I cheated] but then the check to the Financial Aid Office [the 
popular use] would be smaller.”9  Compliance rates are also higher in their study when taxpayers 
are consulted (through a majority vote) about how their money will be used.  “[C]ompliance 
suffers when individuals have no control over the use of their tax payments,” they conclude, and 
“when their taxes pay for public goods that are unpopular.”10  As a result, “government can 
generate greater compliance by ensuring that individuals feel that they have a say in the manner 
in which their taxes are spent, that citizens are well-informed of the outcome of the vote, and that 
taxes are spent in ways consistent with the preferences of the citizens.”11 
 In addition, two recent “real donation” experiments suggest that taxpayers will even give 
voluntarily to the government if they support the way their money will be used.  First, Li, Eckel, 
Grossman and Brown test whether people are willing to contribute voluntarily to the government 
and, if so, whether they donate more or less than to a charity pursuing a similar mission.  The 
study asks college students to make a series of choices (anonymously and voluntarily) in which 
they allocate $20 either to themselves or to a specified organization.  They are given pairs of 
organizations – one a charity and the other a governmental organization – dedicated to the same 
mission, which is either wildlife preservation, disaster relief, cancer research, or education.  On 
average, the subjects give 22 percent of their budgets to governments ($4.40 of $20); this is only 
slightly lower than the 27% they gave to charity ($5.30 of $20).12  
 In a second study, they show that subjects are more likely to give and also more generous 
if allowed to choose a specific use for their donation.13  Subjects are asked to make a series of 
choices about how to allocate $20.  Sometimes they are invited to donate to a general 
government fund (“Gifts to the United States”), and sometimes to governmental agencies that 
serve specific causes (National Cancer Institute Gift Fund or Corporation for National and 
Community Service Disaster Relief Fund).  They are also invited to donate to a general charity 
(the United Way) or to a charity that serves a specific cause (American Cancer Society or 
                                                          
8 James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions, and Tax 
Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGAN. 285, 298 (1993) (“The average compliance rate in IFC [when a popular 
use, student financial aid, is imposed] is 0.228, and falls enormously to only 0.081 when the choice is both imposed 
and unpopular in INC [an unpopular use, the University President’s office]”). 
9 Id. at 301. 
10 Id. at 301. 
11 Id. at 301-302; see also Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc., Taxpayer Attitudes Study: Final Report. Public 
Opinion Survey Prepared for the Public Affairs Division (I.R.S., December, 1984); Quint C. Thurman, Craig St. 
John & Lisa Riggs, Neutralization and Tax Evasion: How Effective Would a Moral Appeal Be in Improving 
Compliance to Tax Law, 6 LAW & POL’Y 309 (1984) (finding significant relationship between index measuring 
objections to government spending and self-reported compliance and finding that attitudes about exchange 
relationship with government affect compliance). 
12 Tara Larson Brown, Catherine Eckel, Philip J. Grossman & Sherry Xin Li, Giving to Government: Voluntary 
Taxation in the Lab, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 1190 (2011). 
13 Tara Larson Brown, Catherine Eckel, Philip J. Grossman & Sherry Xin Li, Do Earmarks Increase Giving to 
Government? (CEEBS, Working Paper No. 8, 2011). 
American Red Cross Disaster Relief Fund).  When giving to the government, subjects are more 
than twice as likely to give if a cause is specified (64% versus 30% of subjects) and their gifts 
are nearly three-times as large on average ($4.78 out of $20 versus $1.68 out of $20).  Giving to 
charities is also more common and more generous if a cause is specified, although the 
differential is smaller (74% versus 54% and $5.82 versus $3.69).  “This suggests that people 
value control over the use of their contributions,” Brown, Eckel, Grossman and Li conclude.  
“When such control is lacking (e.g., the federal general fund or the United Way), people give 
significantly less and are more likely to give zero.”14 
C. The Literature on Prosocial Behavior 
These studies fit within a broader literature showing that people derive utility from 
supporting public goods – a point that, if true, lends credibility to our claim. Indeed, economists 
and psychologists have shown that, in a wide variety of settings, people free ride less than 
economic theory would suggest.15  The terms “prosocial behavior” and “prosocial utility” are 
used to describe this unselfish instinct which leads people to care about the wellbeing of others.16     
1. Tax Morale 
Some of this scholarship has been about tax enforcement: the “tax morale” literature 
shows that U.S. taxpayers comply with the tax law at a higher rate than deterrence models would 
predict.17  Evidence suggests that most Americans pay what they owe even though most would 
benefit economically from cheating on their taxes – since the expected savings would exceed 
expected penalties, given imperfect enforcement.  Indeed, in the United States, the IRS estimates 
the voluntary compliance rate at 84%.18  This compares favorably with compliance rates in many 
other countries.19    
The tax morale literature offers several reasons why American comply so readily.  A 
“social norm” of compliance raises tax compliance rates,20 as do perceptions of fairness in tax 
                                                          
14 Id. 
15 For example, in a common laboratory experiment (the “dictator game”), people are given a sum of money and 
asked to divide it between themselves and another player. They bear no economic consequence for keeping all of the 
money for themselves. Across many different societies, people share some of the money with other players rather 
than keeping it all for themselves as predicted by theories of rational self-interest.  Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, 
Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert Gintis, Joseph Henrich & Richard McElreath, In Search of Homo Economicus: 
Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73-78 (2001). 
16 Bruno S. Frey & Stephan Meier, Social Comparisons and Pro-Social Behavior: Testing ‘Conditional 
Cooperation’ in a Field Experiment, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1717 3 (2004).  
17 James Alm, G.H. McClelland & W.D. Schulze, Why Do People Pay Taxes? 48 J. PUB. ECON. 21 (1992); Lars P. 
Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers are Treated, 3 ECON. OF GOVERNANCE 87 (2003). 
18 http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=158619,00.html. 
19 See, e.g., James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and in Europe, 
27 J. ECON. PSYCH. 234 (2006) (finding that tax morale in the United States is higher than in fifteen European 
countries). See also Joel Slemrod, Trust in Public Finance, (NBER Working Paper 9187, 2002).  
20 James Alm, Ana De Juan & Isabel Sanchez, Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 
KYKLOS 3-18 (1995). 
administration, the perceived equity of government spending, overall levels of trust in the 
government,21 as well as ethical commitments, altruism, and patriotism.22   Indeed, according to 
Professors Alm and Torgler, who are leading figures in the tax morale literature, one reason why 
taxpayers comply is that “[i]f taxpayers perceive that their preferences are adequately 
represented and they are supplied with public goods, their identification with the state increases, 
and thus the willingness to pay taxes rises.”23   
Admittedly, we should not overstate the precision of this literature.  It suffers from a 
reverse causation problem.  While people who mistrust government may be less inclined to pay 
taxes, people who are uninclined to pay taxes might also rationalize this impulse by invoking 
their mistrust of government.24  There are also omitted variable bias problems.  Although we 
know that Americans trust their government more than Greeks and also are more likely to pay 
taxes, we cannot assume that one phenomenon is causing the other; instead, there may be yet 
another factor (e.g., culture, religion, etc.) that encourages both.25     
2. Size  and In-Group Effects 
 Other areas of the study of pro-social behavior – not specifically focused on tax – have 
made more progress in establishing causal links between institutional features and pro-social 
behavior.  In his seminal treatment of the free rider problem and public goods provision, 
Professor Olson famously argued that smaller groups will have an easier time overcoming the 
free rider problem than larger groups.26 Many papers provide some degree of support for this 
hypothesis.27   
                                                          
21 Ronald G. Cummings, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Michael McKee & Benno Torgler, Effects of 
Culture on Tax Compliance: A Cross Check of Experimental and Survey Evidence, (Ctr. for Research in Economics, 
Management and the Arts, Working Paper No. 2004-13); Alm & Torgler, Cultural Differences, supra note 3. 
22 See generally Samuel Bowles & Sandra Polania-Reyes, Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes 
or Complements? 50 J. ECON. LIT. (draft of Sept 2011). 
23 Id. at 243. 
24 Iris Bohnet & Stephan Meier, Deciding to Distrust, in PUBLIC POLICY DISCUSSION PAPER 05-4, FEDERAL 
RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON, at 10 (2005). 
25 Field experiments can be designed to avoid these flaws, but the results do not always seem perfectly consistent. 
For instance, one experiment shows that taxpayers who are told that compliance rates are higher than they might 
have expected will claim fewer deductions.  See Michael Wenzel, Misperception of Social Norms About Tax 
Compliance: A Field Experiment (Ctr. for Tax System Integrity, Working Paper No. 8, 2001), cited in Frey & 
Meier, supra note 16.  Another, by contrast, shows that simple normative appeals to taxpayers asking for compliance 
have little causal effect on taxpaying behavior. See Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Taxpayer 
Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence From a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. 
ECON. 455-483 (2001). 
26 Mancur Olson, Jr. The Logic Of Collective Action: The Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965).  In the 
extreme, people will free ride in small groups just as they do in large groups. So long as the public benefits of a 
public good contribution exceed the private benefits, then there should be free riding and underprovision. Smaller 
groups may be better at designing mechanisms to overcome this problem, however. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, 
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).  
27 See R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, Communication and Free Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contributions 
Mechanism, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 585 (1988); R. Mark Isaac & James M. Walker, Group Size Hypotheses of Public 
 Experimental evidence also demonstrates that individuals are more likely to contribute to 
public goods when the beneficiaries are members of the same “group.”28 Subjects who are 
randomly assigned to one group are more likely to cooperate with other group members than 
with individuals randomly assigned to another group.29 Observational studies reinforce this 
laboratory evidence, showing that redistribution,30 willingness to participate in social 
organizations,31 and public goods provision all decrease as ethnic diversity increases.   
3. Moral Engagement 
 Prosocial behavior can also be encouraged or discouraged by institutional context, 
inspiring either self-interest or so-called “moral engagement.”  This explains the famously 
counterintuitive finding that parents are more likely to pick up children late from daycare if they 
are fined for doing so.  The fine inspires them to view overtime childcare as a service to be 
purchased, rather than as a boorish imposition on the community.32  By contrast, if a fine is not 
seen as a price, but as a penalty for breaching community norms, people are less likely to incur 
it.33 A long literature seeks to document when economic incentives, such as fines, serves as 
“substitutes” for prosocial incentives, as in the childcare example, versus when economic 
incentives “complement” prosocial incentives.34  
D. The “Real World” Case Study of Philanthropy   
So far, we have offered reasons why taxpayers are more likely to comply with the tax 
law, and less likely to change their behavior inefficiently to avoid paying, if they support the way 
their tax dollars are used.  To show the plausibility of this claim, we have cited different aspects 
of the economics and psychology literature on prosocial behavior.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Goods Provision: An Experimental Examination, 103 Q. J. ECON. 179 (1988); R. Mark Isaac, James M. Walker, & 
Arlington Williams, Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing 
Very Large Groups, 54 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1991); James Andreoni & Rachel Croson, Partners Versus Strangers: 
Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMIC RESULTS (2008). 
28 Even a seemingly trivial group identifier (preference for the artist Kandinsky over Klee or vice versa) inspires 
people to behave in a more prosocial manner.  HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES 
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1981). 
29 Lorenz Goette, David Huffman, and Stephan Meier, The Impact of Group Membership on Cooperation and Norm 
Enforcement: Evidence Using Random Assignment to Real Social Groups, AM. ECON. REV., May 2006 at 212-216. 
30 Erzo Luttmer, Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution, 109 J. POL. ECON. 500‒528 (2001). 
31 Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, Participation in Heterogeneous Communities, 115 
Q. J. ECON. 847‒904 (2000). 
32  Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (fines for daycare in Haifa caused 
people to think the fine was a price). 
33  For example, fines for using plastic bags have been even more effective than self-interest would predict, since 
they are viewed as reinforcing a community’s moral commitment. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Motivated by Tax, Irish 
Spurn Plastic Bags, N.Y. TIMES, February 2, 2008. (fines for plastic bags in Ireland was a signal about moral / 
community norms); Patricia Funk, Is There An Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws 
with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. LAW ECON. REV. 135 (2007) (lifting fine on not voting lead to less voting). 
34 Bowles & Polonia Reyes, supra note 22. 
Yet perhaps the most telling evidence that people give money if they support how it will 
be used is the charitable sector.  Millions of people give time and money to charity every day.  
Charitable giving represents 2% of U.S. GDP and individuals across the income spectrum make 
charitable contributions.35   
1. Why People Give: The Literature on Altruism and Warm Glow 
In explaining why donors give to charity, the literature on philanthropy emphasizes, not 
surprisingly, that donors believe in the way their money is being used – a close analogy for our 
claim about the tax system.  The focus of this literature is on two different prosocial motivations: 
altruism and warm glow.36   
“Altruism” means that individuals derive utility from providing goods that can be 
enjoyed by others (public goods).  While altruism’s connection to philanthropy is obvious, there 
are two reasons why altruism is not a complete explanation for charitable giving.  First, if donors 
care only about the overall supply of a public good, they should reduce their giving, dollar for 
dollar, by the amount funded by the government.37 Yet the empirical evidence contradicts this 
prediction. Government funding does not “crowd out” charitable giving to the degree predicted 
by theories relying on altruism.38  Second, if giving is motivated solely by altruism, a small 
number of wealthy individuals should be the exclusive givers of every type of charity.39  The 
reason is that altruistic donors would give when the benefit of spending a dollar on a public good 
outweighs the benefit to them of spending another dollar on a private good, and wealthy 
individuals derive less benefit from another increment of private goods. Yet although wealthier 
individuals do give more in absolute dollars, they do not give more as a percentage of income.40  
                                                          
35 See Giving USA, supra note 5. The non-profit sector produced about 5.4% of GDP in 2010. See The Urban 
Institute, Non-Profits, available at http://www.urban.org/nonprofits/index.cfm.  
36 James Andreoni, Charitable Giving, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 748 (Lawrence E. Blume & 
Steven N. Durlauf eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
37 See James Andreoni, Philanthropy, in HANDBOOK OF GIVING, RECIPROCITY AND ALTRUISM, 1201, 1221 
(Serge-Christophe. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier eds., 2006) (summarizing crowding out hypothesis). See Peter G. 
Warr, Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity, 19 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 131 (1982) 
(developing theory of neutrality in which government contributions crowd out charity on a dollar-for-dollar basis). 
38 See, e.g., Burton A. Abrams & Mark D. Schmitz, The “Crowding Out” Effect of Government Transfers on Private 
Charitable Contributions, 33 PUB. CHOICE 29 (1978) (offering empirical analysis showing that for every dollar of 
government support, there is a decline of 28 cents in private contributions); David C. Ribar & Mark O. Wilhelm, 
Altruism & Joy-of-Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior,110 J. POL. ECON. 425, 444 (2002) (offering empirical 
support for fact that charity is motivated by joy of giving and not altruism, as there is very little evidence of crowd 
out; private giving declines by only 23 cents for every dollar of government spending and by only 8 cents for every 
dollar of spending by a charity with a similar mission, analyzing database from 1986 to 1992 involving database of 
125 organizations that give foreign aid).  There is experimental evidence too.  See Andreoni, supra note 37, at 1223 
(offering citations). 
39 James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. 
J. 464, 465 (1990). 
40To be more concrete, consider a moderate income individual who deplores the idea of others going hungry. If the 
government got into the hunger avoidance business, that individual should give less. Similarly, she should give a 
Since altruism does not fully account for patterns of giving, economists invoke a second 
type of prosocial behavior known as “warm glow,” which means that individuals give to charity 
– not only because they value a particular public good – but also because they want to be the one 
providing it.  Having someone else, like the government, provide the good is not the same as 
being its source.   
Warm glow is a powerful motivation for charitable giving, and we believe there is an 
analogous motivation when people pay taxes to support initiatives they value.  Admittedly this 
would not be the case if warm glow arises only from voluntary giving.  Is the key to warm glow 
that you choose to be the source of the funds, or just that you are the source of the funds?  
Although the literature on philanthropy does not address this question, we believe it is plausible 
to think that variations of warm glow could arise with mandatory payments as well. 
2. Strategies to Encourage Charitable Giving 
Our goal in this Article is not only to suggest that taxpayers are more likely to pay their 
taxes if they support the way their tax dollars are used, but also to help policymakers take 
advantage of this insight through better institutional design.  In this spirit, it is worth surveying 
various ways in which nonprofits encourage giving.   
a. Sympathy for the Cause  
Not surprisingly, fundraisers seek to persuade potential donors of the value of their cause.  
They publicize their successes and seek to show that they are pursuing their mission efficiently.  
In asking for support, many charitable campaigns emphasize specific goals that their fundraising 
will achieve – addressing a particular crisis, financing a new building, and the like. 
Relatedly, nonprofits invite donors to choose what they want to support, so that donors 
are paired with initiatives matching their preferences.41  Some donors to a law school, for 
example, support financial aid, while others support faculty research, public interest programs, 
curricular initiatives, or building projects.  Giving donors a choice also gives them a greater 
sense of ownership, so that they feel personally invested in the cause they are supporting.      
b. Financial Incentives  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
lower percentage of her income to combatting hunger than a wealthier individual with the same commitment to the 
cause. As long as enough wealthy individuals in the population support hunger avoidance, the moderate income 
individual should give nothing. Yet moderate income individuals give to charity at rates comparable to much 
wealthier citizens.  See http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/124xx/doc12480/10-18-charitableTestimony.pdf, at 6 
(demonstrating that households with adjusted gross income below $50,000 give slightly greater than two percent of 
adjusted gross income to charity, while households with $200,000-$500,000 give less than 2.5% of adjusted gross 
income to charity).   
41 David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of 
Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221 (2009). 
In addition, many campaigns involve “matching” grants, which promise that, for each 
dollar raised from a donor, an additional “matching” grant will come from another donor. Why 
should charitable campaigns be organized this way? It would be far simpler for each donor to 
contribute separately. In addition, if charitable giving is motivated by altruism alone, matching 
gifts would be counterproductive, since they would motivate potential donors to free ride.  Yet 
this has not been the experience of fundraisers, presumably because matching inspires warm 
glow. When our donations are matched, we feel as if we are responsible for even more giving – 
not just what we personally give, but also the match triggered by our gift. Indeed, a field 
experiment by Karlan and List finds that the offer of a matching grant increases charitable giving 
by approximately 19%.42 
c. Recognition, Shaming  
Likewise, giving is encouraged through recognition.  People are encouraged to give in 
order to have their names on a building or scholarship, to be included on a list of donors, or to 
serve on a board.  The literature sometimes describes this sort of reputational motivation as a 
form of “extended self-interest.” 43 
E. Lack of Confidence in Government Spending: The Bleak Picture from Polling 
Data 
 So far, we have offered a theory about why taxpayer views on the way tax dollars are 
spent could affect the efficiency of the tax system.  Although we cannot prove our theory 
definitively, we have sought to establish its plausibility by drawing on the literature on pro-social 
behavior and philanthropy.  This literature offers evidence that people contribute to the 
community not only because they have to do so, but also because they want to do so.   
                                                          
42 See Dean Karlan & John List, Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural 
Field Experiment, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1174 (2007); see also John A. List & Daniel Rondeau, Matching and 
Challenge Gifts to Charity: Evidence from Laboratory and Natural Field Experiments, 11 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 
253 (2008) (finding a large increase in donations when a fundraising campaign included matching donations); Frey 
& Meier, supra note 16. 
43 Just as people may give to make a favorable impression on others, they may also give to avoid making a bad 
impression or, relatedly, to avoid the embarrassment or awkwardness of saying “no.”  Peter Diamond has argued 
that this sort of “defensive” motivation should not be viewed as contributing to welfare.  Peter Diamond, Optimal 
Tax Treatment of Private Contributions for Public Goods With and Without Warm Glow Preferences, 90 J. Pub. 
Econ. 897 (2006).  If “warm glow” is really just avoiding the awkwardness of saying “no” to a solicitation, he says, 
we should not view it as a positive source of utility.  See Stefano Della Vigna, John A. List & Ulrike Malmendier, 
Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving, Q. J. ECON. (forthcoming) (estimating that the cost of 
saying no to someone who knocks at one’s door to solicit for charity is between $1.40 and $3.80).  This seems 
wrong to us or, at least, it is a much more sweeping claim than he suggests.  After all, many aspects of consumption 
have this quality.  We might buy a beautiful car to avoid the embarrassment of driving a clunker, and to make sure 
that our consumption is comparable to that of our neighbors (i.e., “keeping up with the Jones’”).  In assessing the 
welfare effects of such a purchase, we would not ordinarily distinguish between a consumer’s sincere appreciation 
for the good itself, on one hand, and the reputational disutility she is avoiding, on the other. 
 If we are correct that people are more likely to pay their taxes if they believe in what the 
government is doing, there is reason to be concerned about the current state of American public 
opinion.  Tax morale may be higher than in other countries, as noted above, but polls show that, 
unfortunately, taxpayer confidence in the way the U.S. government spends money is weak, and 
getting weaker.  According to a 2011 Gallup poll, Americans believe the Federal government 
wastes 51 cents of every dollar it spends.  This is the highest estimate on record, which is 11 
cents more than in 1979 when the first poll on the subject was taken.44   
 It is also sobering that Americans do not seem to connect the taxes they pay with the 
services they receive from the government. For example, a majority of Americans believe they 
get less in government benefits and services than they are paying in taxes, even at a time when 
government spending dramatically exceeds tax revenue by almost 10% of the GDP.45  Similarly, 
surveys about the Bush tax cuts showed that people who favored more spending on specific 
government programs were, ironically, more likely to support the tax cuts.46  Likewise, 
Americans generally endorse “spending cuts” in the abstract as a way to reduce the federal 
deficit,47 but they consistently oppose cuts in specific government programs.  According to a 
2012 N.Y. Times article about a conservative county in Minnesota:  
Support for spending cuts runs strong in Chisago . . . .  But the reality of life here is 
that [residents of the county] continue to take as much help from the government as 
they can get. When pressed to choose between paying more and taking less, many 
people interviewed here hemmed and hawed and said they could not decide. Some 
were reduced to tears.48 
As Larry Bartels has observed, “Survey results . . . make it clear that most ordinary citizens are 
remarkably ignorant and uncertain about the workings of the tax system and the policy options 
under consideration, or actually adopted, in Washington.”49   
 The silver lining here, of course, is that there is significant room for improvement.  
Americans clearly do support specific government programs.  But they seem not to associate the 
                                                          
44 Americans Say Federal Gov’t Wastes Over Half of Every Dollar, GALLUP WEBSITE (Sept 19, 2011), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/149543/americans-say-federal-gov-wastes-half-every-dollar.aspx. 
45 Alison  Kopicki, Most Americans Expect to Give More Than They Receive, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012 
(“A majority of Americans say they expect to pay more in federal taxes over their lifetime than they will ever 
receive in benefits from the government, according to a recent New York Times poll. At the same time, the taxes 
Americans pay today are not keeping pace with the growing costs of government.”). 
46   Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the American Mind, 3 PERSPECTIVES 
ON POLITICS 15, 23 (2005) (“those respondents who wanted to spend more money on a wide variety of specific 
government programs were also more likely to favor cutting the taxes necessary to fund those programs”). 
47 Millionaire Tax Has Support, But More Favor Cuts, DENVER POST, Feb. 24, 2012. (According to an Associated 
Press-GFK poll, “by 56 percent to 31 percent, more embraced cuts in government services than higher taxes as the 
best medicine for the budget, according to the survey, which was conducted Feb. 16 to 20.”)   
48 Binyamin Appelbaum & Robert Gebeloff, Even Critics of Safety Net Increasingly Depend on It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
12, 2012. 
49 Bartels, supra note 46, at 21. 
taxes they pay with the programs they like.  One implication, of course, is for the government to 
focus its spending more on initiatives that are likely to attract popular support.  Another 
implication, which is the focus of this Article, is that the government should make a more 
concerted effort to educate taxpayers about how their tax dollars are spent and to encourage them 
to associate tax payments more directly with government initiatives they favor.  The question, 
though, is how to do this.   
 
II. Applications: Accentuating the Positive and Eliminating the Negative  
We have argued that taxpayers are more likely to pay their taxes – and less likely to 
change labor, savings, and other decisions for tax-motivated reasons – if they support the way 
their taxes will be used.  If we are right, how should our tax system change? How can we 
encourage taxpayers to experience warm glow and other prosocial motivations in paying taxes?  
The overriding goal is to encourage taxpayers to associate taxes with programs they support and, 
correspondingly, to minimize the extent to which they associate taxes with government 
expenditures they oppose.  As the old song goes, “accentuate the positive” and “eliminate the 
negative.”50   
This Part offers examples of how to pursue this goal.  We begin with efforts to focus 
taxpayer attention on popular programs and to avoid waste, and then consider the value of 
formally linking taxes with specific programs, whether through dedicated taxes or user fees.  We 
also argue that the degree of taxpayer warm glow can be influenced – not only by how we 
structure taxes – but also by the level of government that collects them, and by the way penalties 
and audits are structured.   
Before proceeding, we should offer a caveat.  While it is easy to say that we should 
emphasize popular programs and deemphasize unpopular ones, an obvious challenge is that our 
country is diverse, even polarized.  Programs that appeal to some will be resented by others.  In a 
sense, one person’s warm glow is another’s cold shower.  In response, the government can look 
for ways to pair taxpayers with initiatives they personally value.  In effect, this strategy is to 
segment taxpayers, so that individuals are supporting (or at least are focusing on) different 
initiatives.  We return to this sort of choice-based approach – which, as we shall see, is more 
controversial – in Part III. 
A. Prosocial Benefits from Publicizing Popular Government Activities 
Positive publicity for government spending can promote warm glow among taxpayers.  
By analogy, charitable organizations frequently trumpet their accomplishments to inspire warm 
glow, describing their activities in magazines, mailings, emails and tweets.  They market their 
                                                          
50 Johnny Mercer, Accentuate the Positive (Accentuate the Positive, 1944). 
missions with phrases connecting donor support with concrete achievements such as, “for the 
price of your daily latte, you can feed a child.”   
Governments should (and do) engage in similar trumpeting – in signs about “your tax 
dollars at work,” in press releases from politicians about benefits secured for constituents, and 
the like.  Although political scientists generally dismiss these expenditures as inefficient “credit 
claiming” by politicians eager for reelection, the prosocial perspective suggests that this publicity 
has value in two related respects if it enhances warm glow.51    
First, the government can help taxpayers derive satisfaction from paying taxes by 
showing they receive value for their money.52  For example, the government can run an 
advertising campaign in which respected celebrities highlight popular government programs and 
urge viewers to take pride in paying taxes, perhaps modeled on Clint Eastwood’s Super Bowl 
halftime commercial for General Motors.  In addition, an image of the American flag can appear 
on tax forms and software, along with slogans like “Support our Troops” and marketing 
materials to remind taxpayers of programs they support. In this spirit, the Obama Administration 
has added a “Federal Taxpayer Receipt” to the White House Website; taxpayers enter the amount 
of taxes they paid, and the website specifies how much of their money was spent on “national 
defense, health care, job and family security, education and job training,” and other spending 
program.53  Likewise, the IRS could require all tax preparation software to include a similar 
feature and could even require it to be filed with the return.          
Second, by connecting tax payments with programs valued by taxpayers, the government 
should aspire to promote moral engagement, so that taxpayers are motivated by ethical 
commitments instead of bargaining when making decisions about taxes.54  Indeed, positive 
publicity about the government’s work may enhance tax morale and improve compliance.  As 
filing deadlines approach, the IRS already issues press releases describing enforcement 
measures.55  They should also give examples of taxpayers who made voluntary contributions to 
the government beyond what they owe.  In this spirit, the Indian government publicized the fact 
                                                          
51 If the publicity for public spending is overtly political, however, then this may taint the warm glow associated 
with public goods provision, as taxpayers feel that their tax dollars are being applied to enhance electoral prospects 
rather than for public goods. As a result, publicity for public good spending by the government may increase warm 
glow to the greatest degree when it is made in an apolitical context.    
52 Amir Saeed & Attaullah Shah, Enhancing Tax Morale with Marketing Tactics: A Review of Literature, 5 AFR. J. 
BUS. MGMT. 13559, 13563 (2011); Richard M. Bird, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez J & Benno Torgler, Societal 
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will give you a breakdown of how your tax dollars are spent on priorities like education, veterans benefits, or health 
care.”). 
54 See Part I.B.3. 
55 See Joshua Blank & Daniel Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2010). 
that a popular film star paid the highest tax bill in the nation.56  Indeed, a number of studies show 
that stories about pro-social behavior of peers engender compliance more effectively than threats 
of sanctions.57 
Yet we do not mean to paper over the difficulties in implementing this strategy or to 
overstate its effectiveness.  One challenge is cost – or, to be more precise, perceived cost.  If 
taxpayers believe the government is overspending on publicity, it will not have the intended 
effect.  Publicity efforts should thus be taken up slowly and carefully.     
A further challenge – and, indeed, a recurring theme in this Article – is the need to be 
mindful of the diversity of taxpayer opinion, and to target messages accordingly.  This is not 
especially different from the efforts of advertisers to segment the market.  For example, the 
messages for urban and rural areas or for “red” and “blue” states might be different, just as 
political campaigns emphasize different themes in different media markets.   
 Another complication is that government officials who oppose a particular initiative will 
use publicity to portray it in a negative light, and this negative publicity could undermine 
taxpayer warm glow. Regardless of its effect on warm glow, this sort of opposition is an essential 
feature of our democratic system and must be permitted.  But it is worth emphasizing that 
negative publicity will not necessarily undermine warm glow and sometimes can enhance it.  On 
one hand, if the negative publicity is unpersuasive to taxpayers, it may prove harmless.  On the 
other hand, if it is extremely persuasive – so that the program is terminated – the net effect of this 
publicity might be to enhance warm glow, for instance, by increasing the percentage of public 
money devoted to popular programs, and by reinforcing the conviction of taxpayers that the 
government is responsive to their concerns. 
B. Avoiding Government Waste 
 
Just as the government should remind taxpayers that their tax dollars support programs 
they value, the government should also make particular efforts to avoid reminding them of 
government activities they dislike.  For this reason, waste has unique implications for the 
government.  After all, a dollar wasted by a for-profit firm producing a private good does not 
impact consumer utility.  Consumers do not change their view of the product. They still buy it if 
the product’s benefits outweigh its costs (and not otherwise).58 The costs of this waste are borne 
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57 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman & Alice Shih, Evidence From Two Large Field Experiments That Peer 
Comparison Feedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage (NBER, Working Paper No. 15386, 2009) available 
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15386 (showing that positive encouragement through the use of social norms can 
have pronounced effects on energy usage).    
58 The corporate social responsibility literature rejects this premise. See Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, 
Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility, 50 J. ECON. LIT. 51–84 (2012). In effect, the CSR 
literature suggests that private goods such as sneakers or coffee also have some warm glow. If this is the case for 
private providers, then it will be all the more true for government, which has an explicitly public regarding role.    
– not by consumers – but by the for-profit firm’s residual claimants, who should (and do) expend 
funds to avoid waste.  Yet with government waste, taxpayers as a group are the residual 
claimants. A dollar of waste costs taxpayers one dollar. As a result, taxpayers (unlike consumers) 
should (and do) expend funds to limit waste, for instance, through ombudsman and the many 
inspectors general of government agencies.  
 At first glance, the expenditure rule for waste-reducing-activities by the government 
appears simple: a dollar spent on waste reduction should reduce waste by at least a dollar.59  
Spending on waste reduction beyond this level is inefficient, costing more than it yields.   
But this rule ignores the possibility of prosocial utility from government spending. For 
instance, people may feel warm glow in paying taxes, knowing they are supporting important 
public goods. Yet government waste is likely to dim this warm glow.  This perspective is 
familiar to charities, which are often ranked on how efficiently they turn contributions into 
public goods.  Therefore, money spent on reducing waste – whether in nonprofits or in 
government – produces value from two sources. It reduces waste directly, and it prevents the 
reduction in prosocial utility. As a result, the government should devote even more resources 
than a private firm to avoiding waste.60   
In making this point, we recognize that waste is not a self-defining term, and that what 
some consider waste might be a worthwhile initiative to others.  Yet some expenditures will 
offend even those who sympathize with the goal being pursued.  For instance, even the most 
ardent proponent of military spending will not want the military to pay $500 for a wrench.  
Likewise, even those who recognize the importance of managing the government’s buildings 
will doubt the need to spend $800,000 on a lavish Las Vegas conference for General Services 
Administration employees.61     
C.      Taxes with Dedicated Uses 
 
If the conventional wisdom is correct that public goods should be provided until their 
marginal cost (in direct terms and possibly from the distortions caused by taxation) equals their 
total marginal benefit (including direct benefit and redistribution), then it makes no sense for the 
government to specify how it will spend a particular tax.  For example, why would it matter 
whether the proceeds of a government-sponsored lottery will support schools, as opposed to tax 
enforcement?  The marginal costs of the lottery should not depend in any way on the marginal 
benefit associated with schools.  In addition, in requiring particular taxes to fund only specified 
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60 Saeed & Shah, supra note 52. 
61 Tom Cohen & Dana Bash, GSA Official Takes the Fifth on Spending Scandal, CNN, Apr. 17, 2012, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/16/politics/gsa-hearing/index.html. 
programs, we lose the flexibility to redirect tax dollars as conditions change. All else being 
equal, the government obviously should want this flexibility.  
Yet in our view, all else is not equal, so that explicitly linking a tax with a popular 
government program adds value that must be factored into the analysis.  Obviously, specifying 
how a tax will be spent can build political support for it.  For example, although the conventional 
wisdom is that a higher gas tax is politically unattainable in the United States, some 
commentators speculate that President Bush could have persuaded Congress to enact one 
immediately after September 11, 2001 to fund defense against further attacks.  
Similarly, although there is no economic reason why social security has to be funded 
through a separate tax – a point that President Roosevelt’s advisors urged on him – there is a 
powerful political reason.  As FDR explained, 
I guess you are right on the economics, but those taxes were never a 
problem of economics. They are politics all the way through.  We put those 
payroll taxes there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right 
to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits.  With those taxes in 
there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.62 
Our point is that this sort of linkage is relevant not only to politics, but also to welfare.  
As noted above, if taxpayers support the way a tax will be spent, they might work less hard to 
avoid it, due to the prosocial utility associated with paying the tax.  Indeed, studies show that 
taxpayers are more likely to buy state lotteries tickets when the proceeds are dedicated to 
education, instead of the state’s general revenue.63  Likewise, surveys suggest that taxpayers are 
more willing to pay environmental taxes if the proceeds are used to fund environmental 
programs.64 
 Linking a tax to a popular spending program is especially helpful with taxes that are easy 
to avoid.  For example, if state governments dedicate use taxes to a popular cause, such as 
feeding hungry children, they might see an increase in collections.  Taxpayers will be especially 
motivated if they believe that paying this tax will increase the resources available to hungry 
children. 
 The government’s commitment to use a tax to fund a particular cause must be credible in 
order to persuade taxpayers to raise their level of compliance.  In theory, of course, all that 
matters is for taxpayers to believe that their tax dollars are being used to advance a popular 
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public goal – even if, in fact, this is not the case.  If the government announces that use taxes will 
fund meals for hungry children – when, in fact, they will be used for a different purpose – in the 
short run the government might inspire some taxpayers to pay taxes they would not otherwise 
have paid.  But in the long run, when the real facts emerge, this effect will be reversed with a 
vengeance.  Government credibility will be eroded, so that this sort of initiative will be harder to 
pursue in the future. 
 As noted above, a further challenge with this sort of strategy is the reality that, in a 
diverse society, taxpayers have heterogeneous preferences.  Expressly linking a tax with a 
particular goal will encourage supporters of the goal to pay the tax, but it could have the opposite 
effect on opponents.  For example, supporting religious instruction in public schools or longer 
incarceration for drug offenders is likely to inspire some taxpayers, while alienating others.  In 
general, this strategy should be used only for public goals that attract broad support, such as 
social security, health care, and education.65 
D. User Fees 
 
 Many government-provided public goods can be funded through either general revenues 
or more targeted user fees. For example, roads are generally financed with gasoline taxes, but 
sometimes they are funded with tolls. Public goods that can be funded via fees or tolls are called 
“excludible,” because the government can exclude those who do not pay the toll from benefiting 
from the public good. Even more than taxes with dedicated uses, user fees and licenses link 
government revenue and taxpayer benefits.    
 
 Should the government fund excludible public goods via general revenues or fees and 
tolls? The conventional analysis points out that tolls and user fees lead to inadequate provision of 
public goods. If there is no marginal cost associated with using the good (e.g., a car on an empty 
road imposes a near zero marginal cost), then charging a user fee leads to suboptimal use of the 
public good.  Likewise, to the extent we want not only to fund public goods but also to 
redistribute wealth through our tax system, it is harder to do through user fees (unless, for 
instance, the size of the fee is adjusted for income).  
 
 Yet in our view, this analysis is incomplete. Charging user fees allows the government to 
reduce income taxes. In addition, user fees are viewed like any other price. They do not distort 
labor or leisure decisions because the user gets the full benefit of the spending. (This is true even 
without prosocial motivations).  As a result, user fees reduce the inefficiency associated with 
                                                          
65 See e.g., 
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income taxation. Governments should weigh this reduction in deadweight loss against the 
suboptimal use that user fees engender.  
 
 At the same time, a potential concern about user fees is that they might affect taxpayer 
attitudes toward the other taxes they pay. If taxpayers pay separate fees and tolls for all public 
services that are salient to them, they might develop a less favorable view of income taxes, since 
they might become less likely to associate these tax payments with public services that they 
personally experience and value.  Such an effect would offset the efficiency benefits of lower 
taxation enabled by widespread use of user fees and tolls.   
 
E. Subsidiarity 
If taxpayers are more accepting of taxes funding public goods that are more immediate 
and salient, this insight has implications not only for the type of taxes we collect – for instance, 
dedicated taxes or user fees – but also for the level of government that should collect them.  We 
believe that state and local taxes have three advantages over national government. 
First, the public goods provided by lower levels of government are likely to be more 
salient, so that taxpayers are more likely to associate them with the taxes they pay.  Second, and 
relatedly, taxpayers may feel as if they have more of a say in what their local government does, 
so that they feel more invested in the public goods being pursued with their tax dollars.  Third, if 
taxpayers identify especially closely with their local communities, they might be less inclined to 
free ride at their expense; indeed, observational and experimental studies consistently 
demonstrate that smaller and more homogeneous groups have an easier time sustaining prosocial 
behavior than larger and more diffuse populations.66  
Each of these reasons – the salience of the public goods, the readier access to the 
decisionmaking process, and the homogeneity of the communities – suggest that taxes are more 
likely to be efficient if collected locally, instead of nationally.  Our theory about the connection 
between taxes and spending, therefore, offers a new justification for subsidiary, i.e., the principle 
that that public goods should be delivered and funded by the lowest feasible level of governance. 
There is some empirical support for this theory, for instance, in studies of Swiss cantons showing 
that more local autonomy is associated with significantly higher tax morale.67   
 Obviously, there already are a host of other arguments for subsidiarity and federalism in 
the literature.68  For example, subsidiarity allows greater oversight of public goods provision,69 
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enables spending to be tailored to tastes,70 encourages experimentation, 71 and leads to healthy 
competition between jurisdictions for residents.72  These familiar theories focus more on the 
quality of local spending, as opposed to local tax collection.  While we are breaking new ground 
in focusing on tax collection, the two obviously are connected.  After all, if local spending is 
indeed more efficient, as Tiebout models contend, then taxpayers may well experience more 
warm glow in supporting it. 
 Needless to say, there are a number of countervailing considerations that favor higher 
levels of government, including economies of scale, the need to minimize free-riding by one 
jurisdiction on another, greater possibilities for redistribution of wealth, and the like.  Our goal is 
not to offer a comprehensive analysis – all the more so because the analysis has to be context-
specific – but to highlight an additional advantage of subsidiary that has not been emphasized in 
the literature: the relative advantage that lower levels of government have in generating warm 
glow in tax collection.       
F. Fines, Rewards, and Audits 
Our analysis has implications not only for which level of government should collect a 
tax, but also for how penalty and audit strategies should be crafted.  We want taxpayers to view 
cheating as a breach of a moral and civic duty, and not as a wager where fines are the price of 
losing.  So although we obviously need audits and sanctions to provide economic incentives for 
compliance, we do not want these incentives to “crowd out” prosocial motivations.73  Therefore, 
we should strive to structure audits and penalties – and, more generally, to calibrate enforcement 
– in ways that minimize crowding out.   
This obviously is a very broad topic, and our goal is not to offer a specific proposal or a 
comprehensive analysis.  Indeed, we do not claim to know precisely what will work.  A 
challenge is that taxpayer motivations for compliance are heterogeneous, as Alex Raskolnikov 
has emphasized.74   
 Yet a clear lesson that emerges from the literature on prosocial behavior is that context 
matters.  As a result, the government should experiment with various approaches to identify 
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context-specific institutional strategies that promote prosocial motivations.  For example, if the 
government compensates taxpayers for the costs of a random audit, as Joseph Bankman has 
suggested,75 the government would signal a desire to be fair, which, hopefully, would inspire 
taxpayers to reciprocate.76  Likewise, we may want to reward taxpayers if their audit shows that 
they have paid in full, since rewards are sometimes more effective than penalties at triggering 
prosocial motivations.77  In the same spirit, a range of sanctions can be explored for 
noncompliance, including not just cash payments, which are the most likely to crowd out 
prosocial motivations and may even signal that noncompliance is acceptable so long as the non-
complier pays for the privilege,78 but also community service requirements, mandatory civics 
courses, and the like.  These steps are thought to “crowd out” less and may even “crowd in.”79   
 To sum up, then, if a novel approach can change the frame by which taxpayers view our 
compliance system, the benefits would be large. It could lead to “crowding in”, so that the 
incentive complements and reinforces prosocial motivations.80 
III. Applications: Taxpayer Choice 
 While the government should publicize popular programs and dedicate particular taxes to 
fund them, as discussed above, a significant challenge in doing so is the diversity of taxpayer 
opinion.  Taxpayers are likely to disagree about the merits of a particular program, such that 
highlighting it is a mixed blessing.   
 Charities do not face this problem to the same degree, since affiliating with a charity is 
voluntary.  Indeed, the freedom to choose what to support is inherent in philanthropy.   By 
analogy, can we give taxpayers some measure of freedom to choose what they want to support?  
After all, pairing taxpayers with initiatives they support can promote prosocial utility within a 
diverse population.  Some can support the troops, while others can support the schools, and so 
on.  Borrowing from philanthropy, we may also want to recognize taxpayer support with 
matching gifts, naming rights, and the like.    
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 Yet such choices are more complicated for government than for charity, since 
government is inherently a communitarian enterprise.  As a result, a problem with choice-based 
strategies is that they may be in tension with other important values.  The degree of tension – 
and, of course, the extent of the benefit – depend on the specifics of how a choice-based strategy 
is structured.   
 This Part begins by outlining potential benefits and costs that can arise with choice-based 
approaches.  We then discuss two examples that balance costs and benefits somewhat differently.  
First, taxpayers can be allowed to allocate only voluntary contributions that are in excess of what 
they are obligated to pay in taxes (which we call “allocating voluntary payments”), either by 
contributing to independent nonprofits affiliated with the government or to the government itself.  
Second, and more controversially, they can be permitted to allocate even a portion of taxes they 
are legally obligated to pay (which we call “allocating mandatory payments”). 
A. Normative Tradeoffs 
 
1. Potential Benefits 
 Obviously, the main reason to offer taxpayers this sort of discretion is to focus taxpayer 
attention on the segment of expenditures that they especially value, thereby increasing prosocial 
attitudes towards paying taxes and, hopefully, reducing enforcement costs, tax planning costs, 
and the like.   
 In theory, taxpayers could be invited to fund initiatives that are quite specific.  To make 
the program more administrable, though, the government can offer only a menu of broadly-
defined options, such as “support for our troops,” “education and job training,” “crime 
prevention and law enforcement,” “health care,” “the national debt,” and the like.  By facilitating 
this sort of taxpayer choice, we would match individuals with programs they find appealing, 
thereby reminding them that taxes fund initiatives they value.   
In addition, as in the nonprofit world, taxpayers can be recognized for supporting 
particular programs (unless they request anonymity).  For example, they can be included on a list 
of donors posted on a website.  If it is administratively feasible to do so, they should also be 
given details about how their money was used.  For instance, just as donors to financial aid at a 
university are given information about the student they are supporting, taxpayers who chose to 
support our troops can be given the name of the soldier who is being funded by their 
contributions.  
 In addition to encouraging prosocial motivations among taxpayers, a further potential 
advantage of a choice-based initiative is that it can generate useful information.  Policymakers 
will learn what taxpayers support most enthusiastically.  After all, the way people spend money 
is a meaningful indication of what they value – in ways, more meaningful than opinion polls.  If 
our political process is functioning properly, the budget should track, at least in a rough way, the 
distribution of preferences among taxpayers.  If it does not, then that is information our 
legislators should have.  It also should be disclosed, so the media and voters will have this 
information as well. 
2. Potential Costs 
However, there obviously are administrative costs associated with implementing this 
idea.  In addition, there are six other potential concerns, which might – or might not – arise, 
depending upon the details of what taxpayers are permitted to do.  
First, while taxpayers may feel more enthusiasm for the payments they are permitted to 
allocate, there is a risk that they will feel correspondingly less enthusiasm for the rest of what 
they pay the government.  If they associate this residual with programs they did not choose – and 
do not support – they will find it less fulfilling to make this residual payment.  There is an 
analogy here to the challenge nonprofits face in raising money for overhead and other expenses 
that are necessary but not exciting to donors.81  Of course, it may be that taxpayers will not feel 
this way.  For example, they might feel even better about the residual because the choice-based 
payment has reminded them of programs they support.  
Second, when money is allocated by individuals operating independently, this sort of 
decentralized process can have costs as well as benefits.  On the positive side, charities are freer 
to experiment and innovate, as Burton Weisbrod has emphasized, because they do not depend on 
the support of the median voter; for this reason, the civil rights, women’s rights, 
environmentalism, and gay rights were championed first by nonprofits before they were pursued 
by government.82  In addition, individuals are likely to be closer to grass roots organizations, and 
correspondingly less susceptible to the interest group influence than elected representatives, 
since they cannot be swayed by campaign contributions.83  Yet on the other hand, we may worry 
that taxpayers will allocate money based on inexpert judgments and imperfect information, so 
that the results will diverge, in unfortunate ways, from the choices Congress would (or at least 
should) make. For example, taxpayers will make their individual choices without complete 
information about what others are choosing.84  A particular goal is likely to be less appealing to 
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taxpayers if they know that it already has adequate funding – but it is not easy to provide them 
with this information at the moment when they are making their choice, at least if taxpayers are 
all making their selections at essentially the same time.85  Likewise, we might unleash a blizzard 
of public lobbying as interest groups seek to persuade taxpayers to support their category of 
spending.  Of course, this issue is less likely to arise if taxpayers are permitted to allocate only to 
a broadly defined category (e.g., “support our troops” or “education”), as opposed to more 
specific initiatives. 
Third, by framing taxes as more like charitable contributions, we might increase the risk 
that support for the government would crowd out private charity.  Studies show that such crowd 
out has been limited.86  It is possible that this result could change if taxpayers begin playing a 
more active role in allocating their payments to the government, although the opposite is also 
possible; for instance, such a program could encourage taxpayers to develop more of a taste for 
charitable giving.87       
Fourth, allowing taxpayers a role in allocating payments to the government diminishes 
the role of our elected representatives.  For example, would we also allow taxpayers to opt out of 
supporting programs they oppose, as conscientious objectors sometimes strive to do?88  
Depending on how the mechanism for taxpayer choice is structured, it could strike some 
taxpayers as illegitimate, and might even undercut their willingness to pay taxes. 
Fifth, if taxpayers are allowed enough discretion to specify in some detail how their 
money is spent, there is a risk of self-dealing and interest group capture.  For example, we would 
not want the owner of a defense contractor to specify that her taxes will be spent purchasing 
weapons systems from her company.  Again, though, this risk is mitigated if she can choose only 
from a menu of very general items (e.g., “support our troops”). 
 Finally, if government resources are allocated by those who provide them, wealthy 
citizens are likely to allocate more.  This gives them more personal influence on the overall 
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allocation than low income taxpayers;89 indeed, the 47% who do not pay any income tax will not 
be accorded this opportunity, at least if the program is for allocating taxes they otherwise have to 
pay.90  This issue is not unique to an individualized decisionmaking process of this sort, of 
course, since wealthy people tend to have more influence over elected representatives as well.  
But it is worth considering how we can mitigate this effect.  One response is to cap the amount 
that taxpayers can allocate.  But the downside of this approach is that it means less money for the 
government (if it governs voluntary payments) or a less meaningful choice for high income 
taxpayers (if it governs mandatory payments) since the dollar amount is likely to represent a 
smaller percentage of their overall income.  This alternative would be more consonant with 
egalitarian norms, but less effective at promoting prosocial utility among high income taxpayers.  
To sum up, then, allowing taxpayers a role in allocating their payments to the government has 
both benefits and costs.  The precise tradeoff depends on the details of how such an initiative is 
implemented, so we turn now to two different variations.  The first involves extra payments 
made voluntarily, which are above and beyond what the taxpayer owes in taxes.  The second 
involves the mandatory tax liability itself.  
B. Allocating Voluntary Payments 
 By encouraging taxpayers to make extra contributions to support government initiatives – 
in addition to what they otherwise owe in taxes – we would attract additional resources for the 
government, develop information about what taxpayers like to support, and generate warm glow 
that might also apply to the mandatory tax payment itself, since taxpayers would be reminded of 
government programs they value and thus, hopefully, would feel correspondingly more willing 
to pay their (mandatory) taxes as well. 
 In seeking voluntary contributions, the government would in effect function as a charity.  
As a result, this strategy involves the same normative considerations inherent in charitable 
support, including the satisfaction donors feel in supporting initiatives they value, the benefits 
and costs of decentralized decisionmaking, the potential to crowd out contributions to other 
charities, and the disproportionate influence of wealthy donors.91   
 Perhaps the most important difference between letting taxpayers allocate voluntary 
payments and letting them allocate mandatory ones is that the former undercuts the role of 
elected representatives somewhat less than the latter.  If payments are made voluntarily, the 
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government would otherwise not have attracted these resources.  As a result, elected 
representatives would not have had the opportunity to allocate this amount anyway (although, if 
the payment is tax deductible, they could have allocated a portion of it).92  
  2. Fundraising Through Affiliated Nonprofits 
 As for the mechanics of how the government could raise this money, one option is for the 
government to use separate 501(c)(3) organizations.  This already occurs, to a degree.  For 
example, organizations such as the Army Relief Society, the Air Force Aid Society, the 
American Veterans Center, and the Disabled Veterans Charitable Trust raise millions of dollars 
to provide extra services to military personnel on active duty as well as veterans.93  The military 
is just one of many contexts for this sort of initiative.  Local businesses make voluntary 
contributions to “business improvement districts,” which provide extra services not offered by 
local governments.  Private fundraising for State Universities and local public schools are, of 
course, another example. For instance, donorchoose.org is a website in which public school 
teachers solicit funds for particular projects: Since 2001, 180,000 projects have been funded.  
Annual giving has increased from $1 million in 2001 to 27 million in 2010.94 
 Although these nonprofits have been incorporated as part of a government initiative, they 
generally are legally separate from the government.  They have their own employees, boards of 
directors, programmatic activities, and fundraising initiatives.  As a result, they can and should 
offer taxpayers the same ability to choose what they want to support as other charities, along 
with the same recognition (such as naming rights and award dinners), access to leaders of the 
charity, financial incentives such as matching grants (and the tax deductibility of charitable 
contributions), and the like.  We believe this approach should be used more broadly as a way to 
inspire taxpayers to support programs they especially value. 
 In doing so, we should be particularly vigilant about the risk of corruption.  A payment to 
an affiliated nonprofit might be a disguised method of buying influence from government 
officials.  For example, veteran congressman Charles Rangel was censured in part because he 
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improperly solicited corporate donations for a college center bearing his name.95  Although every 
charity must deal with the risk that a contribution is meant as a quid pro quo – for instance, when 
hospital donors seek special care – the risk for government-affiliated nonprofits is potentially 
greater, to the extent that donors expect special access to government officials.   
  2. Supplemental Tax Payments Directly to the Government  
 Taxpayers can be invited not only to contribute to affiliated nonprofits, but also to make 
extra payments – beyond what they owe in taxes – directly to the government.  In effect, 
taxpayers would make a charitable contribution to the government.  This can be an outlet for 
taxpayers who are willing to pay higher taxes than are required by law.  For example, Warren 
Buffett has publicly urged Congress to raise tax rates on the wealthiest Americans.  It would be 
good for the country – and perhaps also fulfilling for him – if he decides to make an extra 
contribution beyond what is legally required.    
There are a number of precedents for inviting extra financial support for the government, 
and some have been more successful than others.  During World War II, over 85 million 
Americans purchased War bonds offering below-market interest.96 All fifty states have “adopt-a-
highway” programs, in which individuals or businesses volunteer to clean or pay for the upkeep 
of a designated stretch of highway and are credited for doing so with a sign.97  Massachusetts 
offers taxpayers the option of paying a higher state income tax rate, although only a fraction of 
taxpayers choose to do this.98  Forty-one states offer the opportunity to make contributions to 
particular funds on their tax returns, and the states raised $38 million in 2008 through this 
initiative.99    Likewise, the Federal Government has kept a general account since 1843 for “gifts 
to the United States.”100  In 1961 it began offering the option of making gifts specifically to 
reduce the national debt, attracting $3 million in 2009.101     
 To make this sort of initiative more successful, the government should model its efforts 
more explicitly on nonprofit fundraising in three ways.  First, since taxpayers have 
heterogeneous preference, they are more likely to contribute voluntarily if they can choose what 
program they will support.   
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Second, the government can offer a matching program so that, by making an extra 
payment, taxpayers can become entitled to allocate the matching funds too.  Indeed, such a 
match effectively is already in place.  Extra payments to the federal government are treated as 
deductible charitable contributions under current law.102     
Third, those who contribute should be recognized publicly for doing so (unless they 
request anonymity).  For example, people who give at a minimum amount to a particular 
program can be included on a list of donors posted on a website.  Tiers can be offered so that 
more generous donors are offered special recognition.  If it is administratively feasible to do so, 
they should also be given details about how their money was used.  For instance, just as donors 
to financial aid at a university are given information about the student they are supporting, 
taxpayers who chose to support our troops can be given the name of the soldier who is being 
funded by their contributions.  
Although nonprofits also raise money by giving donors unique access to the nonprofit’s 
leaders, this strategy obviously would not be appropriate for the government.  Unfortunately, 
campaign contributors tend to receive this sort of access – a regrettable byproduct of our 
campaign finance laws – and we view this as a necessary evil to be minimized.  The government 
should not sell access in return for voluntary tax payments.  Relatedly, there will have to be rules 
against quid pro quos and self-dealing (e.g., “approve my merger and I will contribute to your 
agency” or “I will contribute money if you use it to buy goods and services from my business”).   
C. Allocating Mandatory Tax Payments 
In addition to letting taxpayers allocate voluntary contributions to the government, we 
also can let taxpayers allocate a portion of the taxes they are legally obligated to pay.  This idea 
may sound outlandish at first blush, but it bears some resemblance to the “checkoff” system 
under current law in which taxpayers choose whether to contribute tax dollars to federal 
campaign funds.  In addition, Hungary implemented such a system in 1996, allowing taxpayers 
to allocate one percent of their tax bill to the nonprofit of their choice, which has proved to be 
quite popular among taxpayers.103    
By giving taxpayers some control over how their tax dollars are spent, we can help 
generate warm glow for the portion they allocate and, possibly, for the rest as well, since we 
would focus taxpayer attention on initiatives they value.  On this dimension, allocating 
mandatory payments might be even more compelling than allocating voluntary ones.  At the 
same time, we can generate information about what taxpayers value, as discussed above. 
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In our view, however, allowing taxpayers to allocate mandatory payments is harder than 
allowing them to allocate voluntary ones.  We are more wary of empowering individuals to 
allocate funds that otherwise would have been allocated by our elected representatives, and of 
giving wealthy individuals a disproportionate voice in the process, as discussed above. 
In light of these potential costs, reasonable minds can disagree about whether it makes 
sense to offer taxpayers an ability to allocate their tax dollars and, if so, how much discretion to 
give them.104  The farthest we would go is to offer taxpayers choices that are constrained, so that 
the overall result is unlikely to diverge much – or, alternatively, is hard-wired not to diverge at 
all – from allocations that Congress would otherwise have provided.  In other words, the effect 
of these allocations would be more symbolic than substantive. 
There are three ways to constrain taxpayer choice in this way.  First, the policy categories 
which taxpayers are invited to select can be defined broadly.  If taxpayers are invited to allocate 
money to “social welfare programs,” that is a much larger category – which is harder to overfund 
– than if they are invited to allocate money to a narrower category such as “support for autistic 
children in Rhode Island.”   
Second, limiting the amount that taxpayers can allocate to a small percentage of their tax 
bill also reduces this risk.  For example, if taxpayers can allocate only one percent of their tax 
bill, the potential change in the budget process is capped at one percent. Indeed, there would be 
no change if taxpayers were invited to allocate 1% of their taxes to categories that each 
represented more than one percent of the budget.  Of course, taxpayers will have less of a “real” 
say in the allocation of the budget, but there is still value in reminding them that their taxes fund 
programs they support, and in letting them signal their preferences to Congress.   
Third, the government can leave itself some flexibility to modify the allocations made by 
taxpayers.  The government might commit only to “use best efforts” to allocate taxpayer dollars 
to the programs they choose.  Or alternatively, if taxpayers allocate more to a particular program 
than Congress believes is appropriate, the excess can be carried over to the following year.  To 
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avoid a second year of overfunding, the government can either inform taxpayers of how much 
has been carried forward from the prior year – information that presumably will discourage 
taxpayers in the second year from directing funds to this program – or the government can take 
the more extreme step of deleting the option from the menu in the second year.  The more the 
government leaves itself room to override taxpayer choices, though, the less meaningful those 
choices will seem to taxpayers.  
A downside of constraining taxpayer choice, then, is that taxpayers might not take the 
choice as seriously.  While unsophisticated taxpayers may not fully understand the ways in 
which their choices are limited – since the fungibility of money is not obvious to everyone – 
sophisticated taxpayers will realize that their choices have only symbolic impact.  It would be a 
mistake to hide this fact, since the government would lose credibility when this reality eventually 
comes to light.   
Yet even so, symbolism matters.  As we have emphasized, this choice should remind 
taxpayers of government programs they value, and this heightened awareness might positively 
influence their view even of the taxes that they are not permitted to allocate.  In addition, 
taxpayers could value the choice as a way to signal their preferences.  This information could 




We have argued that taxpayers who support the way their tax dollars are spent are more 
likely to comply voluntarily and less likely to change their behavior to avoid tax.  Although we 
cannot prove this proposition, we show its plausibility by offering direct evidence from a 
literature involving experiments, as well as the economics and psychology literature on prosocial 
behavior.  Likewise, philanthropy is a “real world” analogy, since charitable donors contribute 
money voluntarily -- totaling 2% of the U.S. GDP – largely because they are committed to the 
charity’s goals. 
 Our claim has a number of institutional implications.  The government should publicize 
popular uses of tax dollars, while making particular efforts to root out waste.  The government 
should also rely more heavily on user fees, as well as on taxes, such as the social security tax and 
lotteries for education, which commit revenue to specific (popular) spending programs.  We also 
develop a new justification for subsidiarity – the idea that services should be provided by the 
lowest level of government competent to do so – on the theory that taxpayers will feel more 
closely tied to the activities of a lower level of government and more reluctant to free ride within 
a homogenous local community.  In addition, audits and penalties should be modified to 
encourage prosocial behavior.  The government also should solicit voluntary contributions from 
taxpayers for initiatives they especially value, and may also want to allow taxpayers to allocate 
some of their tax bill, though only in a limited way. 
 
